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Zusammenfassung
In einem allgemeinem Gleichgewichtsmodell wird ein unvollkommener dualer Ar-
beitsmarkt, bei dem in einem Sektor sowohl Effizienzlo¨hne gezahlt werden als
auch Gewerkschaften vertreten sind, die das Lohnniveau fu¨r Ihre Mitglieder aus-
handeln, mit monopolistischer Konkurrenz auf dem Gu¨termarkt kombiniert. Es
zeigt sich, dass nicht nur die Verhandlungsmacht der Gewerkschaften, sondern
auch Marktmacht der Unternehmen auf dem Gu¨termarkt die Arbeitslosigkeit er-
ho¨hen. Dies liegt darin begru¨ndet, dass zum einen ein ho¨herer Wettbewerbsdruck
die Lohnforderungen der Gewerkschaften reduziert und zum anderen die Unter-
nehmen nur einen geringeren Preisaufschlag auf ihre Kosten verlangen ko¨nnen.
Beide Effekte fu¨hren dazu, dass die Preise fu¨r diese Gu¨ter sinken, wodurch die
Gu¨ter- und die Arbeitsnachfrage steigen.
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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium dual labour market model
which incorporates both efficiency wages and union bargaining with monopolisti-
cally competitive firms. In one sector, a traditional sector produces a homogeneous
good and firms face perfect competition on the product market. In the other sec-
tor, monopolistically competitive firms produce a horizontally differentiated good.
In this sector, unions represent the interests of the workers and through bilateral
bargaining with the employers, try to capture some of the rents which accrue here.
Further, firms can increase their profits by paying the workers with the highest
productivity an efficiency wage. Therefore, there is not only a wage differential
between the two sectors, but also within the unionized sector. It is shown that
not only the degree of union bargaining power but also the market power firms
possess on the product market leads to an increase in unemployment.
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11 Introduction
How do efficiency wages and trade unions affect unemployment? Most labour
market models analyse this question within a single labour market economy.
However, there is substantial empirical evidence that wages differ significantly and
persistently across sectors of an economy and that this wage structure cannot be
solely explained by differences in human capital or general work characteristics,
i.e. observationally identical workers receive different wages depending on which
sector they are employed in (see, e.g. OECD 1994). This leads to the conclusion
that the wage differences are more likely to stem from market imperfections and
that emphasis needs to be placed on the differences between various sectors of
the economy.
The model presented here, explains these wage differentials by the joint interac-
tion of efficiency wages and unions with firms facing imperfect competition on the
product market. This is done by assuming the existence of a dual labour market,
an approach first developed by Harris, Todaro (1970) and further developed
in seminal articles by Calvo (1978), McDonald, Solow (1985) and Bulow,
Summers (1986). In this class of models, the labour market is dichotomized into
a primary sector where, for example, wages are higher, there is more job security,
lower turnover rates etc. and a secondary sector, where the exact opposite holds.
This implies that wages are attached more to jobs rather than to workers, with all
“good” jobs in one sector. Although in reality, of course, the labour market can be
segregated into a whole continuum of sectors, the simplifying assumption of only
two sectors has proven to be a good approximation with a large body of empirical
evidence in support of the theory (see, e.g. Haisken-DeNew, Schmidt (1999)
and Dickens, Lang (1993) as well as the survey in Saint-Paul 1996).
The secondary sector produces a homogeneous traditional good and is comprised
of menial jobs for which the wage is determined by market clearing. The primary
sector is characterized by imperfect competition so that rents will accrue here.
This gives unions an incentive to operate in this sector as they will bargain for a
share of this economic surplus for their members. As a result, wages in this sector
will be above their market clearing level, i.e. an equilibrium non-competitive
wage differential exists between the two sectors. These higher wages will induce
agents currently not employed in the high-wage sector to be prepared to spend
2a longer time (unemployment spell) applying for these jobs. Therefore, increased
competition on the product market which leads to lower rents and thus also lower
wages, should also lead to lower unemployment. This is exactly the idea stated in
the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1994, p.23) and presented more formally below.
Hart (1982) was among the first to analyse the interaction of unions and price-
setting firms. However, he assumes monopolistic competition in the Chamberlin
sense which means the number of firms is exogenous and several strong assump-
tions about the demand functions need to be made in order to obtain a unique
equilibrium. More recently, the combination of unions and imperfect product mar-
kets has been taken up by Dutt, Sen (1997) and Arnsperger, de la Croix
(1990). However, in contrast to here, both of these models only assume a single
sector labour market. Pichler (1993) has developed a model in which both effi-
ciency wage considerations and unions are combined. However, in her model, the
union wage is higher than the efficiency wage which is at odds with the empirical
evidence. There are also several recent papers which analyse various affects of
unions within a dual labour market setup. Roberts et al. (2000) analyse a two-
stage bargaining process in which unions first determine a national minimum wage
and then subsequently the wage in the primary sector. A dynamic innovation-
based growth model is developed by Stadler (1999). The original Calvo (1978)
model is extended by Dixon et al. (1999), who incorporate a standard menu cost
setup. Finally, Burda (1988), analyses how unions affect unemployment duration
spells. However, apart from the model by Stadler (1999), all of these papers
have in common that the product market is treated as being perfectly compet-
itive. However, this is, of course, not only an unrealistic assumption, but also
overlooks the fact that the labour and product market are uniquely interdepen-
dent.1 The approach used here, is to extend the original Calvo (1978) model
firstly by assuming that unions and efficiency wage considerations coexist and
secondly, by introducing monopolistic competition in the primary sector.
We find that higher market power on the producer side increases wages and also
reduces the negative unemployment effect of higher wages. The reason for this is
that less intense product market competition allows firms to more easily pass on
1 Stadler (1999) assumes a perfectly competitive consumer goods sector and an imperfectly
competitive intermediate goods sector. Whereas in that model, market power arises due to
innovative activities, here it stems from the consumer demand side.
3higher labour costs to consumers. Therefore, the (absolute) elasticity of labour
demand with respect to wages decreases. As union utility is assumed to depend
both on the attained wage level for its members as well as the number of mem-
bers themselves, a lower wage elasticity will induce unions to raise their wage
demands so that the bargained wage level and consequently unemployment, in-
crease. These theoretical findings are confirmed in empirical research by, amongst
others, Nickell (1999), and Nickell et al. (1994).
The next section derives the optimal consumption and production decisions of
the agents in the economy. Sections 3 and 4 outline the wage bargaining process
and general equilibrium. A conclusion is presented in Section 5.
2 Household and Producer Decisions
The economy is divided into two sectors. In the primary sector, a composite
manufacturing good M , is produced, whilst a traditional good T is produced in
the secondary sector. As stated in the Introduction, there is empirical evidence
that observationally identical (i.e. homogeneous) workers receive different wages
depending on which sector they are employed in. Here, firms in the primary,
manufacturing sector either pay their workers an efficiency wage or a wage derived
from negotiations with unions operating in this sector. This means that the wage
in this sector will be above its market-clearing level, whereas the labour market
in the secondary or traditional sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive.2
The assumption that unions only operate in the high-wage sector is common,
(see, e.g. Layard et al. 1991) as there are no economic rents to be shared in the
traditional sector. As shown below, the bargained wage is always above the wage
level paid in the traditional good sector.
The economy consists of N homogeneous and risk-neutral workers who are allo-
2 Even in Europe, market clearing in the secondary labour market is not contradicted by em-
pirical evidence (see Dolado et al. 1996). There is of course a wage floor influenced either
by the level of social security in a country or national minimum wage levels. However, seeing
as unions here are concerned about relative wages, the absolute height of the wage in the tra-
ditional sector is not important. See, e.g. Jones (1987) for a model with a binding minimum
wage level in the secondary sector.
4cated across the sectors as follows
N = NM +NT(1)
NT = LT , NM = LM + UM(2)
where NT is the size of the workforce in the traditional sector. As the labour
market in the traditional sector always clears, the employed labour force LT , and
the total size of this sector NT , always coincide. The number of individuals in
the manufacturing sector is given by NM and consists of LM employed and UM
unemployed. These unemployed choose to wait for a high-paying job, i.e. they
decide not to take up a job in the low-wage sector. This is in accordance with
the empirical evidence, that although unemployment is a bad signal, being in
a low-wage job may well be an even worse signal.3 However, in the equilibrium
derived below, with risk-neutral workers, the wage in the traditional sector must
equal the expected average wage in the manufacturing sector.
2.1 Households
Each household is treated as an infinitely-lived dynasty. All dynasties are assumed
to have the same discount rate and identical preferences. The intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution is set to unity, so that intertemporal utility U is given by
U(C) =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−ρt) lnCtdt(3)
where ρ is the subjective rate of time preference and Ct is total consumption of
a composite good at time t with
Ct = M
µ
t T
1−µ
t(4)
where µ is the expenditure share spent on manufacturing goods. M represents a
bundle of n varieties of the manufacturing good for which households’ preferences
3 See Laing (1993) andMcCormick (1990), for theoretical models of signalling and job search
as well as Bulow, Summers (1986), who provide both theoretical arguments and empirical
facts within a dual labour market model on the assumption that only the currently unemployed
will receive jobs in the high-wage sector and as to whether this kind of unemployment is
voluntary or involuntary.
5are given by a CES utility function (see Dixit, Stiglitz 1977)
(5) M =
[
n∑
1
mκi
] 1
κ
, 0 < κ < 1
with mi as the consumed quantity of the manufacturing good of brand i. Here,
κ is a measure of the homogeneity of the goods. As κ approaches one, the goods
become almost perfect substitutes for one another. Defining σ ≡ 1/(1− κ), then
σ represents the elasticity of substitution between any two variants. As can be
seen from equation (5), consumers have a “love of variety” and an increase in the
number of brands produced between which consumers can choose increases their
utility.
Consumers face a three stage optimisation problem. First, they must decide how
to divide total income between savings and consumption. Formally, households
maximise utility as given by (3) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
(6) A˙ = rtAt + Iwt − PtCt
where A denotes household assets, r is the interest rate, Iw is average wage income
and P the macroeconomic price index.
Solving this intertemporal optimisation problem results in the Keynes-Ramsey
rule
C˙
C
= r − ρ(7)
which implies
r = ρ(8)
and thus a constant interest rate in the equilibrium.
In a second stage, in each period (so that the time index t can be omitted with-
out loss of information) consumers optimally allocate their total income between
manufacturing and traditional goods, that is they choose M and T so as to
maxC = MµT 1−µ(9)
s.t.: pMM + pTT = I
6where pT the price of the traditional good and I denotes total household income.
pM is the price index of the composite manufacturing good which is defined as
pM ≡
[
n∑
1
p1−σmi
] 1
1−σ
(10)
with pmi as the price demanded by firm i in the manufacturing sector. Thus, a
higher number of firms operating in this sector reduces the price index.
This optimisation problem results in
(11) T =
1− µ
pT
I and M =
µ
pM
I
as the income shares spent on traditional and manufacturing goods respectively.
In a third step, consumers decide how to divide their total spending on manu-
facturing goods amongst the n variants. This leads to a demand for variant i by
household j of
(12) mij =
p−σmi
p
−(σ−1)
M
µI
Assuming that the number of firms n is large means that the effect on the price
index pM of a change in the price of a single firm pmi can be neglected. In this
case, the (absolute) price elasticity of demand for each variety is constant and
equal to σ.
2.2 Firms
Each firm in the traditional sector produces according to an identical technology,
with aggregated output given by
T = LT(13)
This means that labour in this sector has a constant unitary marginal productiv-
ity. Seeing as firms in this sector face perfect competition, it must hold that
pT = wT(14)
with wT as the traditional sector wage rate. Labour productivity and thus the
price level in this sector is normalized to one.
7As stated above, firms in the manufacturing sector bargain over wages with unions
but also face efficiency-wage considerations. Each worker j employed by the firm
has a firm-specific productivity denoted by θ−1j , where θ is a random variable
uniformly distributed in the unit interval for all workers, whose precise realisation
only becomes known after wage bargaining has taken place and the worker is
actually hired by the firm. Depending on the value of this productivity, the firm
will either pay the worker the union wage which acts as a lower bound, or the
higher efficiency wage. Thus, expected output by a representative manufacturing
sector firm i takes places according to
E[mi] = Γ(E[θ
−1
j ])(E[e]Lmi)
α, Γ > 0, 0 < α < 1(15)
where Γ is a technology parameter and E[e] denotes expected effort (as ex ante
it is not clear which wage level the worker receives) with effort e given by
e =
{
(we − wm + 1)λ for we > wm
1 for we ≤ wm
(16)
Lmi denotes the amount of labour employed by firm i in the manufacturing sector,
and we and wm are the efficiency and union wage, respectively. Further, firms
also incur fixed costs f . In the following, the value of labour’s output elasticity
α and the fixed costs f are chosen so as to guarantee that firms have decreasing
average costs to ensure that the number of firms is finite. Therefore, given the
demand function for variants of the manufacturing good (12), firms maximise
their (expected) present discounted value Vmi
max
Lmi
∫ ∞
0
E[pii] exp(−rt)dt = max
Lmi
∫ ∞
0
[pmi(mi)E[mi]− E[w¯mi ]Lmi − f ] exp(−rt)dt
(17)
where E[w¯mi ] is the expected average wage to be determined below.
This optimisation problem is identical in every period so that the time index t
can be omitted without loss of content. Profit maximization leads to
(18) pmi =
1
κ
E[w¯mi ]
∂E[mi]/∂Lmi
From (18) it can be seen that κ is both a measure of the heterogeneity of goods and
also indicates the degree of product market competitiveness. Thus, 1/κ denotes
8the mark-up factor by which prices exceed marginal costs. Thus, a higher value
of κ implies a higher degree of market competition, with σ = ∞(κ = 1) as the
special case of perfect competition.
Totally differentiating (18) with respect to labour and expected wages and as-
suming symmetrical firms, making it possible to drop the index i, gives
κ
∂pm
∂E[m]
∂E[m]
∂Lm
dLm +
E[w¯m]∂
2E[m]/∂L2m
(∂E[m]/∂Lm)2
dLm − 1
∂E[m]/∂Lm
dE[w¯m] = 0
which using the production function as given by (15) and rearranging yields
(19)
dLm
dE[w¯m]
E[w¯m]
Lm
≡ Lm,E[w¯m] =
−1
1− ακ
Equation (19) shows that a reduction in product market competitiveness, i.e. a
lower value of κ, reduces (in absolute terms) the elasticity of labour demand. This
is because lower pressure from competitors means that firms can demand higher
mark-up prices. Therefore, if wages increase, firms do not have to bear the total
burden of these increased costs by dismissing workers, but can instead pass on
some of the higher costs to the consumer. The more market power a firm has, the
higher is the share of the burden that is passed on to consumers and the lower is
the share that the firm itself has to bear, i.e. the lower is the number of workers
that are dismissed.
3 Wage Setting
As stated in the Introduction, there is strong empirical evidence showing that
identical workers receive different wages. In the model here, not only do the wages
between workers in the traditional and manufacturing sector differ, but there will
also be some workers in the manufacturing sector who have such a high value of
firm-specific productivity θ−1j , that the firm will choose to pay them an efficiency
wage which is higher than the wage derived from union bargaining (see Beck et
al. 2001 for a similar setup). Thus, the wage which results from the bargaining
process between firms and unions acts as a minimum binding wage in this sector,
with the efficiency wage as a mark-up over this wage level.
The wage-setting process can be modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage,
right-to-manage wage negotiations take place between firms and unions. In this
9stage, the union wage is determined and firms hire labour as given by their labour
demand function and the bargained wage. In stage two, of those hired, a fraction
will receive an efficiency wage and the others will receive the bargained union
wage. This game is solved by backward induction so that stage 2 is solved first.
In order to decide whether a worker should receive the efficiency or the union
wage, the firm must compare when profits are higher. Seeing as this decision
only needs to be made for hired workers (with the hiring level determined by
the labour demand function and the union wage), firms need to compare per-
worker profits. Seeing as the price level pm and the technological level Γ affect
per-worker profits identically irrespective of the wage a worker actually receives,
the per-worker (relative) profit function pir when the firm pays an efficiency wage
is
pir = θ−1j e
α − we
∂pir
∂we
=
αλ
θj
(we − wm + 1)λ(α−1) − 1 != 0
we =
(
αλ
θj
) 1
λ(1−α)
+ wm − 1(20)
Therefore, the efficiency wage is higher than the union wage iff(
αλ
θj
) 1
λ(1−α)
− 1 > 0
θj < αλ ≡ θ∗(21)
It can easily be checked that for values of θj below this critical level, per-worker
profits are higher than if the firm were to pay the union wage but workers only
exert the minimum unit effort amount.
In order to precisely determine average wages, it is necessary to first derive the
expected efficiency wage that will be paid, i.e. we need to know E[θj|θj < θ∗].
With the uniform distribution this value is easily calculated as θ∗/2. Inserting
this value into the efficiency wage equation above yields
E[w¯e] = 2
1
λ(1−α) + wm − 1(22)
where E[w¯e] is the expected average efficiency wage. Therefore, the expected
average wage E[w¯m] a firm in the manufacturing sector pays is given by
E[w¯m] = θ
∗w¯e + (1− θ∗)wm(23)
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which, by inserting equations (21) and (22), yields
E[w¯m] = αλ
(
2
1
λ(1−α) − 1
)
+ wm(24)
Having determined the average efficiency wage it is also possible to determine the
average expected effort. First, noting that expected effort of someone receiving
the average efficiency wage is
E[e|w¯e] = 2 11−α(25)
means that average expected effort is
E[e] = θ∗2
1
1−α + (1− θ∗)
= αλ(2
1
1−α − 1) + 1(26)
Using this, we are now able to turn to stage 1 where wage bargaining between
firms and unions takes place.
Unions derive utility from wages and employment levels. Specifically, the unions’
aim is to demand higher wages wm than those paid in the traditional sector, i.e.
max
wm
V =
∫ ∞
0
[Lmt(wmt − wTt)] exp(−ρt)dt(27)
where V represents intertemporal union utility and ρ is the union discount rate.4
As above, the wage rate will be constant in a steady state so that the time index t
can be omitted. Thus, during the wage bargaining process, a necessary condition
for unions to maximise their utility is
dV
dwm
=
∂V
∂wm
+
∂V
∂Lm
dLm
dwm
!
= 0(28)
There are two opposing effects in (28). On the one hand, increases in the wage
level directly increase union utility. On the other hand, there is an indirect effect
as the size of the workforce will decline with higher wages, thereby reducing union
utility. In the optimum these two effects need to be equalized.
The most common way of modelling such negotiations is the (generalised) co-
operative Nash bargaining solution. Here, the Nash-maximand which is simply
4 It is assumed that unions have the same subjective discount rate ρ as do individuals.
11
the product of the respective difference in payoffs if an agreement is reached
to the payoff each party receives if no agreement is reached, is maximised with
respect to the wage level. If no agreement is reached, firms have a (negative)
fallback position E[pi0] = −f due to their fixed costs. For this reason, the Nash-
maximand effectively only contains variable profits E[piV ] net of the fixed costs,
i.e. E[pi] + f ≡ E[piV ]. For the unions on the other hand, this fallback position is
the wage rate paid in the traditional sector, which all workers could receive at
any time.5 Therefore, the Nash-maximand Ω is given by
(29) Ω = V β(E[piV ])
1−β
where β is the bargaining power that unions have. Maximising equation (29) with
respect to the wage rate yields
∂Ω
∂wm
= βV β−1E[piV ]1−β
∂V
∂wm
+ (1− β)V βE[piV ]−β ∂E[piV ]
∂wm
!
= 0(30)
Using the envelope theorem by which ∂E[piV ]
∂wm
= −Lm, means that (30) simplifies
to6
E[piV ]
∂V
∂wm
=
1− β
β
V Lm(31)
With union utility given by (27) and the variable profits to labour costs ratio by
E[piV ]
E[w¯m]Lm
=
1− ακ
ακ
(32)
together with the elasticity of labour demand as given by (19), means that equa-
tion (31) leads to a union wage of
wm =
ακ+ β(1− ακ)
ακ
(33)
As can be seen form equation (33), this wage is independent of worker firm-
specific productivity θj. The reason for this is that this variable is stochastically
determined and cannot be influenced by the union. Further, the wage differential
5 Unions treat this wage as exogenous. In other words, they ignore the effect wage negotiations
in the manufacturing sector have on the labour supply in the traditional sector.
6 See Appendix A.1 for the proof that this result holds even when some workers receive an
efficiency wage.
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as given by equation (33), increases with union bargaining power β. For the
extreme case that unions have no bargaining power, (β = 0), the union wage and
the wage paid in the traditional sector equalize irrespective of the intensity of
product market competition. At the other extreme, if all the bargaining power is
with the unions, (β = 1), then the wage differential between the traditional sector
and union wage reaches its maximum. Equation (33) shows that the bargained
wage is a decreasing function of product market competitiveness κ. This is because
more intense competition increases the labour demand elasticity with respect to
wages. Therefore, a given increase in the wage level will lead to a larger decrease
in labour demand. In other words, the negative effect on union utility of higher
wages gains in importance. For this reason, unions will lower their respective
wage demands. Thus, although product market competition is assumed to not
directly influence union bargaining power, it does have an indirect effect through
the elasticity of labour demand and thereby on the resulting wage rate. Therefore,
not only stronger union bargaining power, but also the product market power of
firms leads to higher relative wages.
4 General Equilibrium
Only by determining the general equilibrium values of all endogenous variables
is it possible to take all direct and indirect effects of changes in exogenous vari-
ables into account. This is especially important in the model presented here, as
a change in any of the exogenous variables will lead to a change in the expected
wage to be earned in the primary sector and thereby has an immediate effect on
the household job-taking decision and thus also has indirect implications for the
secondary sector. As has been shown above, due to efficiency wage considerations
and the presence of unions in the primary sector, a non-competitive wage differ-
ential exists between the two sectors. Since labour is homogeneous, all workers
would prefer a job in the high-wage manufacturing sector. However, this wage
differential leads to lower labour demand than the market-clearing level, so that
not all workers can be absorbed by this sector. Therefore, workers at the begin-
ning of their careers or those that become unemployed, must decide whether to
try and obtain a high-wage job but face the risk of a period of unemployment,
or to enter the traditional sector where they can instantaneously find a job. In
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a steady state equilibrium and with risk-neutral workers, expected utility of the
two options must be identical.
For the reasons discussed above, only workers from the unemployed pool are
considered for primary jobs. As there must be a positive probability of finding a
job in this sector, there must also be labour turnover in any period of time. This
occurs due to structural change in the economy or because workers earning the
union wage quit in the hope of finding a new job where they will receive the higher
efficiency wage. This means that each job in the manufacturing sector faces the
probability s(q, θ∗) of being terminated, where q is the rate of structural change so
that ∂s/∂q > 0. The lower the value of θ∗, the lower is the probability that workers
will quit their present jobs as the probability that their firm-specific productivity
will be above the threshold value at the next firm declines, i.e. ∂s/∂θ∗ > 0.
Further, there exists a job-finding rate a, determined endogenously below. This
means that all possible transitions between the states of unemployment and the
primary sector are Poisson processes. As steady state (expected) wages in both
sectors are constant and with symmetrical firms in the manufacturing sector, i.e.
E[w¯mi ] = E[w¯M ], the Bellman equations for the three possible states a worker
can be in, i.e. employed in the traditional sector, employed in the manufacturing
sector or unemployed, are
ρVT = wT(34)
ρVM = E[w¯M ] + s(VU − VM)(35)
ρVU = a(VM − VU)(36)
with VT , VM and VU as the respective present values associated with the three
states. Using the fact that in equilibrium the present value of becoming unem-
ployed must be equal to that of taking up a job in the traditional sector, VU = VT ,
means that equations (34) – (36) yield a job-finding rate a of
a =
ακ(ρ+ s)
β(1− ακ) + α2κλ(2 1λ(1−α) − 1)(37)
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Equation (37) together with the steady state flow condition whereby the num-
ber of people exiting the primary sector during any period of time must equal
the number of unemployed UM finding a job in this time period, aUM = sLM ,
determines unemployment as
UM =
βs(1− ακ) + α2κλs(2 1λ(1−α) − 1)
ακ(ρ+ s)
LM(38)
Equation (38) fully closes the model. Table 1 shows all comparative static effects
that result in the general equilibrium.
Table 1: Comparative Statics
α β κ µ ρ λ q f Γ N
E[w¯m] + + - -
Lm - - + + +
pm + + - - + -
n - + - + + - - - +
uM + + - - - +
pM + + ? - - - + + - -
M - - + + + + - - + +
LM - - + + + + - +
NM + - + + - + + +
NT - + - - + - - +
Y - + - + + - - +
Combining equation (18) with the zero-profit condition yields
pm =
E[w¯m]Lm + f
E[m]
=
E[w¯m]Lm + f
ΓE[θ] (E[e]Lm)
α
Noting that ex ante E[θ] = 1/2, this can be solved for per-firm employment Lm
to give
Lm =
f(ακ)2
(1− ακ)
(
ακ+ β(1− ακ) + α2κλ(2 1λ(1−α) − 1))(39)
Thus, both higher union bargaining strength and higher product market power by
firms (i.e. a lower value of κ), have a negative influence on individual firm labour
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demand. Further, a higher value of effort elasticity λ means that productivity of
workers being paid an efficiency wages rises, so that c.p. the equilibrium level of
per-firm labour demand also increases.
The focus here is on the number of firms n and on the equilibrium unemployment
rate uM ≡ UM/NM . The reason for this is that with the Dixit, Stiglitz (1977)
setting of monopolistic competition assumed here, firms act strategically indepen-
dent of each other. This has as a consequence that the size of the market neither
has an influence on the mark-up factor firms can charge over their marginal costs,
nor does it influence the scale at which these firms produce. Instead, all market
effects work through a change in the number of equilibrium varieties n which are
produced in the economy. This number can be derived as7
(40) n =
µ(ρ+ s)(1− ακ)
(
β(1− ακ) + ακ
(
αλ
(
2
1
λ(1−α) − 1
)
+ 1
))
N
f
[
µρ(ακ)2 + ((1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µακs)
(
β(1− ακ) + ακ
(
αλ
(
2
1
λ(1−α) − 1
)
+ 1
))]
From equation (40) it can be shown that the number of firms is negatively related
to labours’ output elasticity α. This can be explained by the fact that produc-
tivity rises with α. As can be seen from equation (12), a lower number of firms,
which reduces the price index pM , shifts the demand curve for the remaining
firms upwards. As prices and wages remain unaffected by the number of firms,
the higher output associated with increasing values of α automatically increase
firms’ revenues so that the new equilibrium is characterized by fewer firms pro-
ducing at higher output levels. Higher union bargaining power β will lead firms
to shed labour, reducing their wage bill. These firms will then earn short-run
positive profits, which will be eroded in the long-term as new firms enter the
manufacturing sector. A rise in product market competition intensity κ lowers
the manufacturing sector wage which directly reduces firms’ labour costs. How-
ever, this effect is outweighed by the positive effect of κ on labour demand, so
that net costs increase, forcing some firms to exit this sector as they now make
a loss. Further, a higher value of κ has the added effect of reducing the price a
firm can demand, so that c.p., revenue drops. As there is no strategic interaction
7 See the Appendix A.2 for the derivation.
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between firms, lower revenue forces some firms out of the market (or to merge
with other firms). In other words, more intense product market competition leads
to fewer but larger firms. Similarly, higher fixed costs f , are also counteracted by
fewer firms operating at higher output levels.
Increases in either the consumption share of manufacturing goods µ, the subjec-
tive rate of time preference ρ, or the size of the population N , all lead to higher
demand for manufacturing goods. This ensures that firms increase their revenue
and make positive profits in the short-term which induces more firms to enter this
sector, thereby increasing employment in the high-wage sector. Thus, households
have two channels, µ the income share spent on manufacturing goods and their
rate of time preference ρ, by which they can influence their own employment
chances and the decision whether to face a spell of unemployment and search for
a high-wage job or immediately take up a job in the traditional sector.
A higher value of the effort elasticity λ will reduce the number of firms operating.
The reason for this effect is that an increase in λ makes firms more profitable
and increases their output. With no corresponding increase in demand, prices
will decrease which leads to a loss in revenue and forces some firms out of the
market with the remaining firms producing at a higher output level.
The higher the rate of structural change q, the lower is the equilibrium number of
firms. The reason for this is that frictional unemployment increases so that total
wage income earned by the households in the economy declines. This in turn
means that demand for manufacturing products decreases, forcing some firms to
exit the market as they would make losses.
The other endogenous variable of crucial interest is the unemployment rate uM
which is given by
uM = 1− ακ(ρ+ s)
ακ(ρ+ s) + βs(1− ακ) + α2λκs(2 1λ(1−α) − 1)(41)
To understand the comparative static effects, it is necessary to analyse both
the change in employment and the number of workers looking for jobs in this
sector. Changes in either labours’ output elasticity α, competition intensity κ,
or union bargaining power β, all gives rise to an “output” and a “number of
firms” effect on total employment. An increase in α will not only increase worker
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productivity so that labour demand per-firm declines, the corresponding higher
output will also lead to a reduction in the number of firms. Simultaneously, the
higher expected average wages will entice some workers previously employed in
the traditional sector to start searching for a job in the high-wage manufacturing
sector. Finally, a higher value of α also increases the critical threshold value of
job-specific productivity θ∗. This will induce some workers currently receiving the
union wage to quit their job as they now have a higher probability of finding a job
in which they receive the higher efficiency wage. Therefore, the unemployment
rate is unambiguously an increasing function of labour’s output elasticity.
Higher values of union bargaining power β lowers per-firm output but leads to
a higher number of firms. However, due to the higher wages that result as β
increases, some workers previously employed in the traditional sector will now quit
that sector and become unemployed and look for a job in the high-wage sector.
Therefore, with lower labour demand and more job searchers, the unemployment
rate must increase with union bargaining power. Note however, that even if unions
have no bargaining power, i.e. β = 0, unemployment will still exist due to some
workers receiving efficiency wages in this sector preventing it from clearing. These
efficiency wages decisively depend on the value of λ. Although an increase in this
parameter will lower the number of firms, it also leads to a reduction in expected
wages so that labour demand increases. This reduction in expected wages has the
further effect of leading some workers to stop searching for a job in this sector, so
that the job-finding rate increases. Even though this effect is slightly counteracted
by the increase in the critical job-specific productivity θ∗ which will lead some
workers earning the union wage to quit their jobs, the overall effect of a higher
effort elasticity is a fall in the unemployment rate.
The output effect occurs with higher values of κ as it lowers the union and thereby
expected average wages and thus increase per-firm labour demand and output.
However, simultaneously, the higher degree of competition reduces the number
of firms which has a negative effect on total output. At the same time, due
to the decline in expected manufacturing sector wages, some workers will stop
searching for a job in this sector, thereby decreasing the number of unemployed
and increasing the rate at which the remaining unemployed find a new job. It
can be shown that the per-firm output effect and the effects associated with
the decrease in the manufacturing sector wage always dominate the number of
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firms effect so that the unemployment rate unambiguously falls. Therefore, just
as higher union bargaining power is bad for employment, so is higher market
power by firms.
The final two effects which can be seen from (41) are the influence that the
subjective discount rate ρ, and the rate of structural change q via s, have. Turning
to the former, it can be seen that a higher discount rate lowers the unemployment
rate. This can be explained twofold. Firstly, the consumption level increases with
ρ, leading firms to produce more and consequently hire increased levels of labour.
This means that the job-finding rate a increases. Secondly, some of the formerly
unemployed will now opt for a job in the traditional sector as with higher values
of ρ, the present value of high-wage jobs decreases. Therefore, an immediate low-
wage income as opposed to a spell of no income whilst applying for a high-wage
job becomes more attractive. Both effects lower the unemployment rate. The
opposite holds for increases in q. Although it too leads to a higher job-finding
rate a, at the same time more people become unemployed at any given time. This
not only directly increases unemployment but also indirectly via lower national
income Y which in turn reduces goods and labour demand. Lastly, it can be
seen from equations (38) and (41), that if s = 0, implying that there are no job-
separations, then no unemployed individual can ever hope to find a job in the
high-wage sector. For this reason, all workers who do not find a manufacturing
sector job, will immediately take up a job in the traditional sector.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a dual labour market model which combines efficiency
wage considerations and union wage bargaining with monopolistically compet-
itive firms. It was shown that unemployment not only positively depends on
higher union bargaining power but also on the amount of market power that
firms possess on the product market and the degree in which firms pay their
workers an efficiency wage. There are two effects by which the level of product
market competition influences unemployment. Firstly, there is the direct effect by
which more intense competition leads to lower mark-up prices. This price reduc-
tion is concomitant with higher product market (and therefore labour) demand.
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But there is also an indirect effect associated with the competition intensity.
More intense competition means that firms are less well able to pass on increased
costs to consumers. Therefore, the only other way firms can reduce their costs is
by dismissing a part of their workforce. Therefore, higher product market com-
petition intensity also leads to a higher (absolute) elasticity of labour demand.
However, seeing as the level of employment is important for union utility, unions
will lower their wage demands correspondingly. These lower bargained wages also
reduce the efficiency wage paid which in turn means that fewer workers quit their
jobs and consequently, that the unemployment rate is lower. However, it should
be noted that even if economic rents are decreased when competition becomes
more intense, there are numerous other channels through which firms can achieve
economic rents, e.g. through innovations (see Stadler 1999). Therefore, higher
product-market competition must be one part of a whole policy-mix needed to
substantially reduce EU unemployment.
Nevertheless, positive effects on unemployment of increased competition are still
to be expected and are often stated as one of the benefits of European Monetary
Union. As price levels become more comparable within the EU, it does indeed
seem likely that this will increase the elasticity of substitution between two vari-
ants leading not only to lower wages but consequently also lower unemployment.
The model here predicts that this increased competition leads to fewer but larger
firms, i.e. that firms merge in order to obtain economies of scale and reduce their
costs. However, this emphasizes that it is increasingly important that govern-
ment policies are aimed at strengthening product market competition and that
it is recognized that unions as such only have a dwindling influence on national
unemployment levels.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Union Wage
As stated in the main text, the production function is given by
E[m] = ΓE[θ−1] (e(wm)Lm(wm))
α
so that optimal labor demand is
pim
∂Lm
=
∂pm
∂E[m]
∂E[m]
∂Lm
E[m] + pm
∂E[m]
∂Lm
− w¯m != 0
∂E[m]
∂Lm
pmκ− w¯m = 0
Here we require
∂pim
∂w¯m
=
∂pm
∂E[m]
∂E[m]
∂w¯m
E[m] + pm
∂E[m]
∂w¯m
− Lm − w¯m ∂Lm
∂w¯m
!
= 0
=
∂E[m]
∂w¯m
pmκ− Lm − w¯m ∂Lm
∂w¯m
which can be rewritten as
∂pim
∂w¯m
=
(
∂E[m]
∂Lm
∂Lm
∂w¯m
+
∂E[m]
∂e
∂e
∂w¯m
)
pmκ− Lm − w¯m ∂Lm
∂w¯m
=
∂Lm
∂w¯m
(
∂E[m]
∂Lm
pmκ− w¯m
)
+
∂E[m]
∂e
∂e
∂w¯m
pmκ− Lm
As the term in brackets is equal to zero and further, as can be seem from equation
(26), expected effort is independent of the union wage, this equation simplifies to
−L.
A.2 Derivation of the Equilibrium Number of Firms
From the definition of the size of the working population, it is possible to derive
the size of the traditional sector as
NT = N − nLm
(
1 +
s(2wm − (2− λ))
(ρ+ s)(2− λ)
)
(A.1)
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Further, using the optimal income shares households spend on either type of good
yields
NT =
1− µ
µ
npmm
=
1− µ
µ
n(E[w¯m]Lm + f)(A.2)
Equating equations (A.1) and (A.2) and making the appropriate substitutions
makes it possible to solve for the number of firms as
n =
2µ(ρ+ s)(1− ακ)(ακ+ β(1− ακ))N
f
[
2β(1− ακ)((1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ) + ακ(2(ρ+ s)(1− µ(1− ακ))− µρλακ)]
Multiplying per-firm labor demand as given by equation (39) with the equilibrium
number of firms gives total employment in the manufacturing sector. This value
for LM can in turn be inserted into the unemployment equation (38) to yield the
number of unemployed.
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